From November 30 to December 12, 2015— ten years ago—France spearheaded an agreement that was unanimously hailed as a success. In his closing remarks, Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs and chair of the conference, made no secret of his satisfaction:
Its main content—namely, promises of strictly national emissions reductions, without any binding commitments on the part of the states (referred to in UN terminology as “nationally determined contributions”)—was not, however, driven by France: it was, for the most part, a Sino-American initiative.
Emissions reduction pledges are too low
For the first time, the countries that are parties to the Climate Convention have officially established a target for the maximum allowable temperature increase.
The goal—advocated in the final days of COP21 by a coalition of small island states and particularly vulnerable countries—was now to “keep global warming well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C.”
The Paris Conference thus took the step of committing to the long-term decarbonization of the global economy. But it did so without imposing any binding commitments on nations: it simply convinced itself that a foundation of voluntary national transformations would suffice.
The problem is that the “national contributions” submitted by the parties to the COP—assuming they do not remain empty promises—would in any case lead to global warming far exceeding the agreed-upon target: at least +3 °C over the course of the century.
The gap is staggering: to stay on track to meet the 2 °C—and certainly the 1.5 °C—targets, national contributions would have had to be no less than 30% and 41% more ambitious, respectively, by 2030.
Had we naively imagined that they would be quickly addressed after this initial trial run? Hadn’t the Paris Agreement, behind the scenes, built in a way out—or a loophole—whose subtlety and implications we probably failed to grasp in 2015?
Is Carbon Capture and Storage Essential?
The adoption of a temperature stabilization target automatically entailed—as a physical constraint imposed by the dynamics of atmospheric chemistry—the goal of net-zero emissions, that is, a balance between anthropogenic emissions from sources and anthropogenic removals by greenhouse gas sinks.
It was in the context of colossal decarbonization efforts that this carbon neutrality goal was introduced in Article 4 of the agreement. But, insidiously, it had opened a loophole: to maintain this impossible balance between such an ambitious goal and such insufficient “national contributions,” the imperative was to remove massive amounts ofCO₂ from the atmosphere.
And to do that, we need to rely on technologies such as carbon capture and storage. This wasn’t shouted from the rooftops in Paris, but without technological solutions—and carbon capture in particular—the goals of the Paris Agreement would have been completely unattainable.
A New Wave of Investment
The first investments in the energy transition and low-carbon technologies date back quite some time. However, they have only become apparent since the early 2000s and did not truly take off until after the COP21 conference in Paris.
They increased 15-fold between 2004 and 2020, reaching $755 billion in 2021—just over 648 billion euros— with at least half of that amount in Asia. They then climbed to $1,100 billion (859 million euros) in 2022, with China as the leading investor at $546 billion (469.4 billion euros), compared to $141 billion (121.2 billion euros) for the United States. By 2024, these investments had reached $2 trillion (1.718 trillion euros).
These investments, which are part of what we call “climate capitalism,” were largely mobilized by the Paris Conference.
As economist Jean Pisani-Ferry writes:
“Emissions reduction commitments subsequently gained enough credibility that a significant portion of global companies began investing in the development of a low-carbon economy. This sparked a battle between ‘brown’ capitalism and a new form of ‘green’ capitalism, which is banking on the development of clean technologies.”
China's climate capitalism is leading the pack
By “climate capitalism,” we mean the reconfiguration of productive structures—technologies, institutions, and behaviors—that would incorporate climate change as a new dimension of value production and capital accumulation, that is, of the pursuit of profit and investment.
Today, Chinese climate capitalism—even though China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and the world’s largest consumer of coal—is leading the race toward decarbonization and the green transition.
China’s strategy has positioned industrial decarbonization as a powerful geoeconomic weapon. This is evident in installed renewable energy capacity, the markets for rare earths, solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles, as well as in patent filings for clean energy and, more recently, the installation and market for massive electricity storage batteries, which are set to reshape the energy transition.
By the end of the 2000s, China had begun efforts to reduce air pollution (which was widespread at the time), aiming to build an “ecological society, ” with the first electric motorcycles and buses appearing in major cities.
In the years leading up to the Paris Agreement, China conceived and developed one of its most pivotal development plans, which was officially launched in the spring of 2015 under the name “Made in China 2025.” The stated goal was to become an industrial leader, particularly in the electric vehicle and clean energy sectors . Ten years later, this plan has proven to be a success.
Climate capitalism, which is driven by the China and which is outpacing the United States—a petro-state—is growing stronger and will certainly have solidified its position by 2050.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Readthe original article.
