One year after its adoption by the Iraqi Parliament on January 21, 2025, and its entry into force on the following April 17, the new Personal Status Code is beginning to take effect, while sparking significant controversy. This legislation, which breaks with the legal balance established by the 1959 law, governs essential aspects of private life—marriage, divorce, parentage, child custody, and inheritance—in a particularly sensitive political context. Since the 2000s, Iraq has been undergoing a gradual restructuring of its institutions, marked by the strengthening of sectarian dynamics and an increased role for religious authorities in the organization of social life. In this environment, women’s rights—already undermined by persistent patriarchal structures—are all the more vulnerable.

The reform adopted in 2025 goes far beyond a simple adjustment to family law. It reflects a more profound shift in the way the state approaches its relationship with religion and the diversity of Iraqi society. While its supporters see it as a recognition of religious identities, its critics highlight the risks it poses to the coherence of the legal system and, even more so, to the protection of women’s rights.

A Profound Transformation of Family Law: Toward a Pluralistic, Faith-Based Legal System

To assess the impact of this reform, it is essential to recall that personal status law in Iraq was historically based on Law No. 188 of 1959. At the time, this law was considered one of the most progressive legal frameworks in the Arab world, despite certain unequal provisions. Its main objective was to unify the rules governing marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance, regardless of religious affiliations.

Drawing inspiration from both Islamic Sharia law and modern civil law, it introduced certain protections for women while retaining discriminatory provisions. Polygamy, for example, remained permissible but was subject to a judge’s authorization (Article 3). Repudiation was not completely abolished, even though Article 40 allowed a woman to file for divorce on grounds of harm. Article 7 also set a minimum age of 18 for marriage, subject to judicial oversight. Despite these advances, structural inequalities persisted, particularly with regard to inheritance, where Sharia rules continued to apply.

The 1990 reform introduced certain procedural adjustments—particularly regarding divorce and the recognition of spousal consent—without calling into question the patriarchal foundations of the system. Beginning in 2003, against the backdrop of political realignment following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, more ambitious initiatives sought to establish separate legal systems based on religious affiliation.

Resolution No. 137 of December 29, 2003, adopted by the Iraqi Governing Council, proposed entrusting each community with the administration of its own family law. However, it was quickly suspended and then abandoned. Civil society, women’s rights organizations, and the international community opposed the resolution, denouncing the risks of legal fragmentation and potential violations of women’s rights—particularly through the recognition of practices such as early marriage or unilateral custody of children (custody granted exclusively to the father).

The 2025 reform builds on these developments while introducing a significant change. It marks a complete break with the logic of unification by establishing a plurality of legal systems and placing religious courts at the heart of the system. Ja’fari Shia rites are now explicitly recognized as a legal framework for personal status matters, alongside other religious traditions. Citizens can thus choose the system applicable to their situation, introducing an unprecedented diversification of family law.

This choice is made at the time of marriage registration or in the event of a dispute before the competent court. The parties may determine the applicable religious framework, either by mutual agreement or at the initiative of one of them. In practice, this choice may also depend on the parties’ declared religious affiliation or on the court hearing the case. Once the framework has been selected, all rules (regarding marriage, divorce, and child custody) are applied according to the corresponding religious interpretation, resulting in significant differences in individuals’ rights and obligations.

This reform represents a major shift toward regulatory decentralization. Consequently, the state no longer imposes a single framework but instead facilitates the coexistence of several parallel systems, in which the conditions for marriage and divorce, the rights of spouses, child custody, and inheritance may vary depending on the chosen religious tradition. Presented as a recognition of diversity and an expansion of freedom of choice, this flexibility actually creates greater legal uncertainty, complicates access to the law, makes judicial decisions less predictable, and undermines the principle of equality before the law.

More broadly, the new Code marks a shift toward a pluralistic and confessional model of family law, in which religion becomes a central criterion for social regulation. The consequences are profound: increased complexity in the legal system, a weakening of the protections afforded to individuals—especially women and children —and a reinforcement of the dynamics of social fragmentation. Far from being merely a legislative adjustment, this reform constitutes a structural reconfiguration of the relationship between the state, the law, and religious institutions in Iraq.

A Controversial Reform: Risks of Fragmentation and Setbacks for Women's Rights

Criticism of the new Personal Status Code focuses primarily on fundamental rights, and more specifically on women’s rights. Numerous NGOs, as well as legal experts and civil society actors, are warning of a significant setback, and recent examples provide concrete evidence of these dangers.

In October 2025, Human Rights Watch reported the case of Ghazal H., a woman who was summoned to court after her ex-husband requested that the new Ja’fari code be applied retroactively to their marriage—without her consent—in order to strip her of custody of their 10-year-old son. This case illustrates how reform can become a tool for controlling the lives of women and children.

Under the 1959 law, custody of children in the event of divorce was, in principle, awarded to the mother, with the aim of protecting the child’s best interests, and subject to judicial review to assess the actual conditions of care. This system made it possible, at least in theory, to maintain maternal custody beyond a certain age, if that was in the child’s best interest.

Under the new Code, certain interpretations now allow for an automatic transfer of custody to the father once a child reaches a certain age (generally around 7 years old), without an individualized judicial review of the situation. Thus, a mother who had previously held daily custody may lose it to the father, even if his living conditions are less favorable. This change reduces the role of the judge and relegates the criterion of the child’s best interests to a secondary role, in favor of rigid standards based on paternal authority.

On this subject, Sarah Sanbar, an Iraq researcher for Human Rights Watch, states:

“The new Personal Status Code further institutionalizes discrimination against women, legally relegating them to the status of second-class citizens. It deprives women and girls of their ability to make decisions about their own lives and transfers that power to men. It should be repealed immediately.”

Several feminist organizations have called for the repeal of these provisions, denouncing their harmful impact on women’s rights and child protection. On January 27, 2025 (shortly after the new Code was adopted), the World March of Women (an international feminist organization) issued a statement condemning these amendments and warning of the threats they pose to fundamental human rights. For its part, Amnesty International had already urged the Iraqi Parliament in 2024 to reject these amendments even before they were adopted.

Despite these warnings, in September 2025, the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq dismissed a lawsuit filed by women’s rights and human rights organizations challenging the validity of the amendments adopted by Parliament. The Supreme Court ruled that the legislative process was in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution, which guarantees citizens the freedom to choose the religious law applicable to their personal status. It upheld the amendments, including those recognizing the application of Ja’fari jurisprudence, thereby solidifying their implementation and putting an end to the main legal challenges. This decision strengthens the position of Parliament and the supporters of this reform, demonstrating that, despite criticism, it remains within constitutional bounds.

The first tangible effects of the reform became apparent as early as February 2026. A court in Baghdad had approved the marriage of a 17-year-old girl to a 20-year-old man without considering the bride’s consent or well-being. While the new Code maintains 18 as the minimum age for marriage in principle, it allows for exceptions based on the chosen religious framework. Thus, under Ja’fari rites, the legal age of marriage may be lower than 18 and as young as 9 for girls (while it is set at 14 for boys). These situations demonstrate how a reform that appears neutral on the surface can, in reality, lead to significant social setbacks.

Until her assassination, Yanar Mohammed was at the forefront of the protests against these legislative changes. Lawyers, doctors, and civil society experts have also voiced their opposition, arguing that the amended law “victimizes” children and “undermines women’s rights.” Some legal experts have warned that automatically granting custody to the father and restricting women’s access to property or inheritance could profoundly destabilize families. United Nations experts have condemned the amendments. Criticizing the lack of a transparent and inclusive debate prior to their adoption, they asserted that the amendments could “undermine the rights of women and children.”

Beyond its individual effects, the reform raises a structural issue: by establishing different legal systems based on religious affiliation, it exacerbates Iraq’s legal and political fragmentation. This gradual shift from a unified, state-regulated model to a fragmented, sectarian legal system undermines national cohesion and complicates citizens’ access to justice.

Supporters of the reform emphasize the recognition of religious identities and the freedom of choice it offers. However, specific cases of early marriage, unilateral changes to the law, and automatic transfers of custody show that these arguments are not very convincing. The risks to equal rights and the protection of women and children are now evident.

A debate that reflects the concerns of Iraqi society

The adoption of the new Personal Status Code in Iraq marks a major milestone in the country’s legal and institutional evolution. While it reflects a commitment to recognizing religious identities, it raises serious questions regarding equality, national cohesion, and respect for fundamental rights.

The risks of legal fragmentation and setbacks for women’s rights are the main sources of tension. They illustrate the dilemmas Iraq faces today as it works to build its modern legal system. In a changing regional context marked by wars, this development raises questions about the Iraqi state’s ability to reconcile religious pluralism with the effective protection of individual freedoms, particularly those of women.

As in the Arab world as a whole, Iraqi women are navigating a path fraught with obstacles, where every right they have won is the result of a relentless struggle…

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